The fact that Crowdstrike very obviously and intentionally fuzzed the line between ring 0 drivers and app metadata simply could not have been done without MS’s tacit (at the very least) approval. The initial version where Cloudstrike introduced that side loading threat definition update vector should have been flagged as an issue - more specifically, they should have held them to a FAR more rigorous testing and resiliency standard than they were. This is fairly standard practice (and in many cases enforced as regulatory measures) for highly critical systems and components in a lot of industries, and I’ve worked in two of those industries.

[–] BatmanAoD@programming.dev 3 points 3 months ago

Yeah, that part is pretty wild and definitely Microsoft's fault.

[–] hatedbad@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 3 months ago (1 children)

Microsoft creates secure boot: “we should be able to run whatever we want on our hardware!”

Microsoft lets users install crowdstrike on their computer: “Microsoft shouldn’t let us run this on our hardware!”

[–] gravitas_deficiency@sh.itjust.works 2 points 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago)

Way to miss the nuance lol

What I’m saying is that if a system claims to rigorously validate code that runs in a particular sensitive domain (here, ring 0), it should actually rigorously validate code. This was a process failure at the end of the day.